Γιατί η Τουρκία δεν επεμβαίνει ενεργά υπέρ Αζερμπαϊτζάν για το Ναγκόρνο Καραμπάχ;

[dna replication]

[Στρακαστρουκας]

To ισραηλ κερδισε καποιον πολεμο απο τις ΗΠΑ και εχει επιβαλει ορους?

Oχι, αλλα απαιτει απο τις ΗΠΑ να μην πουλανε οπλα τελευταιας τεχνολογιας στους Αραβες. Με τα ΗΑΕ καταπιε την παγια αυτη πολιτικη

[zoltan]

Σιγά σιγά βγαίνουν πράγματα προς τα έξω. Αυτά που κρατάω:
-το αρμενικό σύστημα επιστράτευσης, προώθησης αποστολών συμπλήρωσης και η αναπλήρωση απωλειών σε έμψυχο και άψυχο δυναμικό δεν λειτούργησε όπως έπρεπε. Οι μονάδες στο μέτωπο είχαν συνεχώς μειούμενη δύναμη
-γίνεται κριτική για τις περικοπές, το κλείσιμο μονάδων και την προς τα κάτω αναδιοργάνωση των αρμένικων δυνάμεων πριν τον πόλεμο, στο όνομα του εξορθολογισμού. Η δέυτερη γραμμή άμυνας, που δεν λειτούργησε τελικά, βασιζόταν σε αυτές τις μονάδες που έκλεισαν
-γίνεται κριτική των οπλικών συστημάτων που αγοράστηκαν. Τα ΤορΜ1, Ιγκλα κλπ σύγχρονα αντιαεροπορικά όπως και τα Σμερτς (πυραυλικό πυροβολικό) απέδωσαν καλά. Τα ΟΣΑ ήταν άχρηστα και δεν κατέρριψαν τίποτα. Τα Σου30 δεν χρησιμοποιήθηκαν.

αυτόματη μετάφραση από τα ρώσικα

Former head of the General Staff of the Armenian Armed Forces and former NKR defense Minister Movses Hakobyan spoke about a number of purely military reasons for Armenia's defeat in the war.
The video itself is in Armenian and is more than 1.5 hours long. Interesting facts:

1. Pashinyan stopped mobilisation activities on the 3rd day of the war, sending untrained volunteers to Karabakh instead.

2. Mobilization in the territory of Armenia was carried out only by 52%, in the territories of Karabakh by 78%. At the same time, these figures were reached only on the 5th day of the war, at a time when according to the plan, 40 hours were allocated for this. Further, the lag from the schedule increased even more. In fact, the planned mobilization failed. The reason for this was both objective measures of counteraction of the enemy (to which the military did not always respond flexibly), and the actions of the political leadership, which actually disrupted the mobilization.

3. Centralized distribution of volunteers was nonexistent, they chose themselves where to go. According to the plan, the troops in each direction were replenished by 50% from Artsakh and 50% from Armenia. Problems arose on the right and left flanks, where it was not possible to provide replenishment of parts of the first line. The volume of replenishment of the first line from the NKR was only 32%. Armenia also failed to meet the planned replenishment targets. Units on the first line stood exactly until they lost their combat capability in the absence of full-fledged replenishment of losses. For the first three days, they were quite successful in solving combat tasks. Then the resource ended, and it was not possible to replenish them or reinforce them with other parts. Both people and parts were missing. The reasons for this lie in the peculiarities of pre-war planning and the quality of preparation for war.

4. In accordance with the kind of "secret solution", before war was reduced to 5 artillery regiments, which had Mat.part, headquarters and so on and which were to be deployed after mobilization. As part of the "optimization", it was decided to abandon them. A similar fate befell several companies in Karabakh itself, which were reduced in order to save money. It was these companies that were to hold the second line of defense and, after mobilization, be manned and consolidated into battalions sitting in fortified areas, ensuring greater operational stability of the entire formation of the Armenian troops. In addition, in some companies, in order to "optimize" and "save", separate platoons were reduced. In a significant part of the departments, the number of fighters was lowered from 11 to 9. That is, the "optimization" of the armed forces was complex and led to far-reaching consequences.

5. Already at the beginning of the war, more than 1.5 thousand people deserted from the Armenian troops, who fled to the territory of Armenia, because they were initially assigned the wrong tasks. Some were brought back after explanatory work.

6. the Purchase of the su-30SM and the OSA air defense system is a mistake, since they did not fully participate in the Karabakh war. The blame for making this incompetent decision lies with Pashinyan and his henchmen in the leadership of the Armenian armed forces.

7.during the 44 days of the war, the Armenian authorities deliberately misinformed the Armenian society, which was not fully aware of the severity of the situation at the front, many times exceeding the standard amount of disinformation in the event of war.

8. Hakobyan praised himself for purchasing the Smerch MLRS, tor SAM, Verba and Igla MANPADS from Russia, which performed well in the Karabakh war. The "Needles" and "tori" accounted for the bulk of the downed Azerbaijani and Turkish UAVs.
"Tori" was purchased in 2017-2018 under Sargsyan. Until 2022, it was planned to purchase two more divisions of Tor,1 division of "Smerch" and a large batch of modern Russian ATGMs and grenade launchers. But due to Pashinyan's coming to power, the plan for the purchase of weapons was revised and instead of the above, they purchased su-30SM fighters without missiles from the Russian Federation (there are serious restrictions on the supply of weapons for them) and outdated OSA air defense systems, spending money on them that was intended for modern Tor and Smerch. According to Hakobyan, the reason for this change is that the su-30SM and the OSA air defense system can be purchased quickly and cheaper, while the Toras are more expensive and the full delivery must be waited for longer. Actually, this is the answer to the question of why the Armenians were so bad with air defense.

9. Hakobyan confirmed that Armenia used the Iskander missile defense system during the fighting, but did not specify the purpose and result of the attack.

10. Preparation for the war failed by chief of the General staff of the armed forces of Armenia Davtyan, who appeared in this position after Pashinyan came to power. Under him, the number of staff employees increased by 95%, and the number of real fighters decreased. Defense plans in Karabakh and plans for the purchase of weapons were also changed for the worse. Hakobyan calls the decision on this appointment completely illiterate. Davtyan was replaced by Pashinyan in June 2020.

And so on.

Pashinyan's spokeswoman said that law enforcement agencies should deal with Hakobyan for "false statements".

[zoltan]

Ακόμα μια ανάλυση

By Evgeny Krutikov, originally at Vzglyad – The end of the Second Karabakh War gave rise to many mysteries and conspiracy theories. Indeed, some of the circumstances of this conflict are extremely mysterious, or at least paradoxical from the point of view of conventional military logic. Apparently, the Armenian leadership has itself provoked a political catastrophe.

Let us list exactly which mysteries raise the biggest questions and provoke the emergence of “conspiracy theories” in Armenia (and not only there).

1. Why didn’t Armenia carry out full-fledged mobilization and sent fully equipped military units to the conflict area?

Despite loud patriotic statements, no real mobilization was carried out in Armenia. The peacetime numerical strength of the Armenian army – around 50 thousand people – was increased only by volunteers. While the conditions of hostilities demanded to increase the number of people defending Karabakh to at least 80-100 thousand people. At the same time, very soon the shortage of specialists (for example, for artillery and missile defense systems) began to affect the frontline troops in the Armenian army. There was no one to replace those who died or were wounded.

It is inexplicable for what reason Yerevan did not begin to carry out real mobilization. The Armenian leadership simply avoids talking on this topic. If there was a mobilization plan, no one tried to fulfill it. As a result, there was no rotation of servicemen on the frontline, in some areas people were sitting in trenches for a month without rotation. On the frontline, there were 18-20-year-old guys and at some point, very young people who previously never fried a single shot made up to 80% of the personnel. The Karabakh detachments, made up of professionals and veterans, suffered heavy losses in the very first week, for which there were no replacements, since no reinforcements were sent.

Volunteer units in Armenia were formed according to party lines. The scandal was caused by an attempt to form a separate detachment of the “Prosperous Armenia” party named after the oligarch Gagik Tsarukyan – now Pashinyan’s main opponent. The two have been in conflict for over ten years. Now the prime minister openly calls Tsarukyan “the culprit of the fall of Shushi,” since his phantom squad allegedly was not enough at the front to win. These conflicts could have been avoided simply by having a mobilization plan and a desire to implement it.

The main military forces of Armenia did not move to Karabakh. But in order to relieve the tension created by the Azerbaijani UAVs, it was enough just to redeploy early detection radars to Goris. And one army corps would have been enough to cover the southern direction even at the stage when the Azerbaijanis languidly stomped in front of the first line of defense. The proper supply was not organized and after a month of fighting this led to a shortage of missiles for missile defense systems and shells for cannon artillery. And without the support of artillery, the infantry can only die heroically.

All this is borderline sabotage, although it can be partially explained by local slovenliness and unwillingness to weaken the defense of Armenia proper. The latter is a very controversial position and it looks like the Armenian leadership has simply abandoned Karabakh to its fate.

2. Why did the northern front behave so strangely?

In the north and northeast of Karabakh, in the Madagiz region, there was a large fortified area of ​​the Armenian defense, which included a lot of combat-ready units. And they really put up serious resistance to the advancing Azerbaijani group and in the end actually stopped it (although they lost several positions and villages).

But after that the elite battalion “Yehnikner” suddenly retreated, although its commander was awarded the “Hero of Artsakh” medal. Moreover, since October 3, neither Yekhnikner nor any military unit at all from the northern front has been removed and has not been transferred to the aid of the fledgling south. At the same time, the Azerbaijanis only once decided to imitate an offensive in the north again, clearly for distracting purposes. There was no need to keep up to 20 thousand people in the north.

The Karabakh leadership informally explains all this by the lack of resources. But now the “lack of resources” in Karabakh is used to explain everything.

3. Why did the southern front collapse?

The fact that the Azerbaijanis were striking the main blow in the south, in the flatland zone, was already visible with the naked eye in the first few days of the war. Nevertheless, resources – human and technical – began to arrive on the southern front when this front was essentially lost. The flatland zone was lost, and the front stopped along the edge of the mountains from the Red Bazaar to Martuni. As a result, up to 30 thousand people have gathered in this area, defending Karabakh. They were threatened with complete encirclement and death, which was one of the reasons for the signing of the ceasefire agreement. At the same time, before the occupation of Jabrail, the Azerbaijani troops advanced very slowly, disrupting their own pace of the offensive. This gave the Armenians a small relief, in order to understand the situation and start redeploying.

After the occupation of Jebrail, the front began to fall apart, and the advance of the Azerbaijanis sharply accelerated. The momentum was lost.

For what reason did the Armenian command not decide to transfer additional resources to the southern front? This is another mystery.



4. Why did the Armenian side confine itself to only passive defense?

During the entire war, the Armenian side made only two attempts to counterattack against the forward units of Azerbaijanis who were moving far ahead. Both times this happened opposite of Lachin in a narrow gorge, with the extreme vulnerability of the Azerbaijani battalion-tactical group (BTG). Once even successful. But these operations boiled down simply to the massive delivery of MLRS strikes against enemy positions. Operations to close the gorge and encircle the enemy in other sectors of the southern front were more than an obvious solution in this situation. But not a single Armenian unit moved from its position. An incredible war in which one of the parties did not conduct a single offensive operation on the ground, limiting itself to only and exclusively passive defense.

A successful counteroffensive in the gorge in front of Lachin would grind so many Azerbaijani forces in the cauldron that they would not think about attacking Shusha for at least a couple of weeks. And later it was quite possible to destroy the Azerbaijani infantry in the Averatanots gorge. But for this to work, it was necessary to put an additional effort.

There is no explanation as to why the Armenian side did not even try to counterattack or use other methods of its operational advantage. The lack of resources can be endlessly referred to only in the last stages of hostilities, but the passive defense has been a constant tactic from the very beginning of the war.

5. Why was Shushi surrendered?

The most sensitive and incomprehensible question. The first assault on the city by the Azerbaijani infantry was extremely unsuccessful. Then, the second column of Azerbaijanis was covered by an attack by the MLRS. With some effort and assistance from Armenia, the Azerbaijani group that had broken through to the city could’ve been completely destroyed. Nevertheless, a decision was suddenly made to leave the city without a fight and not to make attempts to liberate it with a favorable operational-tactical situation still remaining for at least 24 hours.

It is believed that the decision to abandon Shushi was made by the NKR President Arayik Harutyunyan and the NKR Security Council Secretary-General Samvel Babayan, a local legend. Now, in protest against the signing of the armistice, he left his post and renounced the title of “Hero of Artsakh”. The Armenian YouTube channel Lurer (Novosti) published a recording of the negotiations between Babayan and Harutyunyan, from which it follows that General Babayan really assessed the possibility of recapturing Shushi even after it was abandoned, but painted a gloomy image for any future prospects of resistance.

Fragment of conversation (not literal translation): “Let’s calculate the (combat) mission. We cover Shushi with twenty, thirty volleys of “Smerch”. We kill everyone there. We take the city back. What’s next? The state of the army and the civilian population does not allow waging war. They fought, took Shushi, then what? (…) We cannot fight a NATO army, along with the mercenaries, fully equipped … Yesterday I tried to organize an operation with three battalions. We have four howitzers in total. If we are not provided with artillery, then how are we going to support the offensive or cut off its tails (the enemy – approx. Vzglyad)? (…) Today we must finally negotiate with Russia that we are surrendering these territories and leaving. Or they help us.

Imagine that we have two Grads for the whole army today, a dozen howitzers for which we have no shells. “

To summarize, General Babayan believed that resistance was useless at this stage of hostilities. We must abandon the continuation of the war and either surrender, or ask for ten days for an organized exit of the local population and the 30 thousand soldiers of the southern front who are completely surrounded. As an alternative, it was proposed to urgently ask Russia for direct military assistance in the form of PMCs or volunteers, equipment and ammunition.

But all this does not change the question of why a small group of Azerbaijani infantrymen without heavy equipment, which broke through to Shushi, was not destroyed before panic began in the Armenian army. The retention of Shushi would’ve created a completely different architecture of political agreements for NKR and Armenia. If this is a political decision, then who actually made it?

* * *

This list of mysteries of the second Karabakh war is far from complete. In addition, a lot of the same questions about the preparation for war should be answered by the Armenian leadership. This war was lost even before it began, precisely because of Yerevan’s inaction or strange actions.

These questions will be asked a long time after the war has ended. The situation in the region has changed so radically over these forty days that all old approaches to resolving the conflict and to its military component are now gone. And the new reality will require new solutions for Armenia. And it is not yet clear who will make these decisions.

[nyxtovios]

Το ξαναποστάρω και εδώ μιας και είναι ανανεωμένο

https://www.protothema.gr/world/article ... eglimatos/

Λέει :
"Ο Κενάν Ακίν αποτάθηκε στην Interpol ζητώντας να βγει από τη λίστα των ανθρώπων που καταζητούνται διεθνώς για εγκλήματα. Η απαίτηση του έπεσε στο κενό και από το 1996 περιφέρεται μεταξύ ψευδοκράτους, Τουρκίας και Αζερμπαϊτζάν."

Το Αζερμπαιτάν δεν είναι η χώρα που μας τα έχει πρήξει τις παράνομες καταλήψεις εδαφών και την νομιμότητα;
Άλλη μια απόδειξη για το με ποιούς έχουμε να κάνουμε. Μόνο με ατύχημα στους μελλοντικούς πυρηνικούς σταθμούς τους ξεμπερδεύεουμε.

Εντομεταξύ έχω μια Αζέρα στο fb το καθημερινό spamming είναι γεγονός. Μου την έχει δώσει θα αρχίσω να της ποστάρω τα δικά μου κάτω από τα σχόλιά της. Βέβαια δε νομίχω πως θα είμαστε φίλοι για πολύ αν το κάνω και κρατιέμαι.

[Στρακαστρουκας]

Οι Αρμενιοι πρεπει να συνετριβησαν στο πεδιο της μαχης για να υποχρεωθουν να δεχτουν αυτην την συνθηκολογηση. Βλεποντας τα εδαφη που παιρνουν οι Αζεροι ειναι προφανες οτι σε 5-10 χρονια μπορουν ανετα να κανουν νεο ντου και να καταλαβουν οτι απεμεινε

[nostromos]

δεν χρειαζοτανε να συντρβουνε ... στο σημειο που ειχανε φτασει οι Αζεροι ηταν ευκολο να χαθει ολη η περιοχη αφου ελεγχανε τους κυριους αξονες ...

[pylothess]

Ο πόλεμος τέλειωσε.Η Αρμενία έχασε εδάφη. Κερδισμένοι βγήκαν το Αζερμπαϊτζάν που κέρδισε εδάφη , σίγουρα κερδισμένη είναι η Τουρκία επειδή κέρδισε τον πόλεμο ο σύμμαχός της,αλλά κερδισμένη βγαίνει και η Ρωσία αφού με δική της μεσολάβηση ,παρέμβαση σταμάτησαν οι εχθροπραξίες.Επιπλέον αναλαμβάνει η Ρωσία τον ρόλο της διαφύλαξης της ασφάλειας στην περιοχή. Αυτά γράφουν πάνω κάτω τα διάφορα sites στο internet.

Εμείς τι διδάγματα παίρνουμε; Μήπως ο στρατός των Αρμενίων δεν ήταν αρκετά καλά εξοπλισμένος; Μήπως οι Αρμένιοι είχαν στηρίξει όλες τις ελπίδες τους στην Ρωσία; Καλές οι συμμαχίες αλλά άμα τα περιμένεις όλα από τους άλλους στο τέλος δεν γίνεται τίποτα. Στο κάτω κάτω ακόμα και αν ήθελε η Ρωσία να επέμβει υπέρ της Αρμενία δεν μπορούσε να το κάνει γιατί το Αρτσάχ δεν είναι διεθνώς αναγνωρισμένο κράτος από τον ΟΗΕ. Αν εισέβαλλε το Αζερμπαϊτζάν στην Αρμενία θα μπορούσε να επέμβει ενεργά η Ρωσία.

[dna replication]

[Υδράργυρος]

To ισραηλ κερδισε καποιον πολεμο απο τις ΗΠΑ και εχει επιβαλει ορους?

Oχι, αλλα απαιτει απο τις ΗΠΑ να μην πουλανε οπλα τελευταιας τεχνολογιας στους Αραβες. Με τα ΗΑΕ καταπιε την παγια αυτη πολιτικη

Δεν είναι η πρώτη φορά
Σαουδαραβικά F-15

[Υδράργυρος]

Αυτός δεν έχει φύγει ακόμα σαν τον Σαακασβίλι; Δε θα έχει καλό τέλος

[pylothess]

Το έχω γράψει και σε άλλο νήμα . Ο Πούτιν δεν μπορούσε να επέμβει για να υπερασπισθεί μια αυτόνομη περιοχή που δεν είχε αναγνωριστεί από κανέναν ως κράτος.

[Green Dragon]

Το έχω γράψει και σε άλλο νήμα . Ο Πούτιν δεν μπορούσε να επέμβει για να υπερασπισθεί μια αυτόνομη περιοχή που δεν είχε αναγνωριστεί από κανέναν ως κράτος.

Προφανώς.

Οι Τούρκοι μπορεί να φαντάζουν σαν σεληνιασμένοι στα ελληνικά μάτια αλλά η αλήθεια είναι ότι όλες οι κινήσεις τους είναι προσεκτικές και μελετημένες. Το μόνο πράγμα που θα μπορούσε να τους πλήξει πραγματικά είναι ο μεγαλοϊδεατισμός τους, δηλαδή ο ίδιος τους ο εαυτός.

[Prepon]

Το έχω γράψει και σε άλλο νήμα . Ο Πούτιν δεν μπορούσε να επέμβει για να υπερασπισθεί μια αυτόνομη περιοχή που δεν είχε αναγνωριστεί από κανέναν ως κράτος.

Αυτα είναι παπαριές.
Οι μεγάλες δυναμεις επεμβαίνουν όπου γουστάρουν.

Δικαιολογιες του Πουτιν

[Orion22]

Ποιος μίλησε για αγωγό (, East Med); Από ισραηλινά λιμάνια θα φεύγει με πλοία προς Ευρώπη , κατευθείαν από τις χώρες του Κόλπου. Αγωγό ισως δούμε από ΗΑΕ και ΣΑ μέχρι Ισραήλ. Οι Εμιριδες ενδιαφέρονται για να επενδύσουν σε μεγάλο λιμάνι του Ισραήλ. Win-win η συμφωνία του Αβραάμ για Άραβες και Εβραίους, με πολύ μεγάλες προεκτάσεις που θα ξεδιπλωθούν στο μέλλον.

Μην το χεις για σίγουρο: θυμήσου το terminal υγροποίησης στην Αίγυπτο