Esse é o Brasil do seu Bolsonaro!!!

[blackpaint]

ολα τα 14χρονα του φορουμ με μενα βρηκατε ν ασχοληθειτε;

[Nandros]

'
Εκπαιδεύουμε τα 3ίχρονα! Στράάάτα, στρατούούούλα!
.

[Drexler]

[Otto Weininger]

[Pam]

Ορκίστηκε πρόεδρος της Βραζιλίας ο Μπολσοναρου ανήμερα πρωτοχρονιάς: https://www.protothema.gr/world/article ... orthotita/

[Orion22]

εδώ πιο memable

[Mole]

[...] How then is Bolsonaro to be classified? Often heard on the left in Brazil, and in the liberal press in Europe, is the opinion that his rise represents a contemporary version of fascism. The same, of course, is a standard depiction of Trump in liberal and left circles in America and the North Atlantic at large, if typically assorted with escape clauses – ‘much like’, ‘reminiscent of’, ‘resembling’ – making clear it is little more than lazy invective.[5] The label is no more plausible in Brazil. Fascism was a reaction to the danger of social revolution in a time of economic dislocation or depression. It commanded dedicated cadres, organised mass movements and possessed an articulated ideology. Brazil had its version in the 1930s, the green-shirt Integralistas, who at their height numbered over a million members, with an articulate leader, Plínio Salgado, an extensive press, publishing programme and set of cultural organisations, and who came close to seizing power in 1938, after the failure of a communist insurrection in 1935. Nothing remotely comparable either in terms of a danger to the established order from the left, or of a disciplined mass force on the right, exists in Brazil today. In 1964, there was still a major communist party, with influence inside the armed forces, a militant trade-union movement, and growing unrest in the countryside, under a weak president calling for radical reforms. That was enough to provoke not fascism but a conventional military dictatorship. In 2018, the communist party of old was long gone, combative trade unions were a back number, the poor passive and dispersed, the PT a mildly reforming party, for years on good terms with big business. Breathing fire, Bolsonaro could win an election. But there is scarcely any organisational infrastructure beneath him and no need for any mass repression since there is no mass opposition to crush. Is Bolsonaro better pigeonholed as a populist? The term now suffers such inflation as the all-purpose bugbear of the bien pensant media that its utility has declined. Undoubtedly, his posture as a valiant foe of the establishment, and style as a rough-hewn man of the people, belong to the repertoire of what is generally viewed as populism. Modelling himself on the president of the US, he outdoes Trump in wrapping himself in the national flag, and spewing a Twitter stream – 70 per cent more tweets than the latter in his first week in office. But in the gallery of right-wing populists today, Bolsonaro does not fit the standard bill in at least two respects. Immigration is not an issue in Brazil, where just 600,000 of a population of 204 million are foreign-born – 0.3 per cent, compared with some 14 per cent in the US and UK, or 15 per cent in Germany. Racism, of course, is an issue, to which Bolsonaro like Trump has made covert appeals, and whose violence in the practices of the police he will encourage. But unlike Trump, he won a large black and pardo constituency in the polls, and is not likely to risk this by anything approaching an equivalent of the xenophobic anti-immigrant rhetoric in the North Atlantic. A third of his party in parliament, indeed, is not white – a higher percentage than in the much vaunted progressive Democratic contingent in the 116th US Congress.

A second significant difference lies in the character of Bolsonaro’s nationalism. Brazil is not a country either afflicted or threatened by loss of sovereignty as in the EU or by imperial decline as in the US or UK, the two drivers of right-wing populism in the North. His patriotic chest-beating is more factitious. Today he is no enemy of foreign capital. His nationalism, in expression hyperbolic enough, essentially takes the form of virulent tropes of anti-socialism, anti-feminism and homophobia, excrescences alien to the Brazilian soul. But it has no quarrel with free markets. In local parlance, it offers the paradox of a populismo entreguista, a ‘supine’ populism – one in principle at least, perfectly willing to hand over national assets to global banks and corporations. Comparison with Trump, Bolsonaro’s closest analogue as a politician, indicates a different set of strengths and weaknesses. Though he comes from a much humbler background, Bolsonaro is less illiterate. Education in a military academy saw to that: books are not a complete mystery to him. Aware of certain of his limitations, he lacks Trump’s degree of egomania. Trump’s overweening confidence in himself comes not just from a millionaire family background, but a long career of success in real estate speculation and showbusiness. Bolsonaro, who has never run anything in his life, has no such existential build-up. He is much less secure. Given, like Trump, to every kind of intemperate outburst, unlike Trump, he will quickly back off if reactions become too negative. The first weeks of his administration have been a cacophony of conflicting statements and retractions or denials of them. It is not just in character, but by circumstance, that Bolsonaro is a more brittle figure. Both he and Trump were catapulted to power virtually overnight, against all expectation. Trump took the presidency with a much lower percentage of the vote – 46 per cent – than Bolsonaro’s 55 per cent majority. But his supporters are ideologically fervent and solidly behind him, whereas Bolsonaro’s support may be wider, but is shallower, as post-electoral polls indicating rejection of many of his proposed policies show. Trump, moreover, came to power by taking over one of the two great parties of the country, where Bolsonaro won power effectively on his own, without any institutional support at the polls. Once elected, on the other hand, he will not, because he cannot, rule without taking account of the institutions around him, as Trump has tried to do. This doesn’t mean he will be less brutal, since in Brazil many of these institutions are more authoritarian than in the US. The indigenous peoples of the Amazon are sure victims: unlike blacks a negligible quantity at the polls, as cattle ranchers sweep across their habitat (with long-term consequences that will not be appeased by the dismal gestures of the Global north towards arresting climate change), they will be the first to suffer. So too, it is easy to imagine especially if the economy fails to pick up and he needs to distract attention from it – Bolsonaro cracking down viciously on student protests; rounding up activists of the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST) or its urban equivalent, the MTST, and banning their organisations; breaking strikes, where necessary. But jungle apart, such repression is likely to be retail, not wholesale. More, for the minute, would be surplus to requirements.

Perry Anderson, Bolsonaro’s Brazil

[Ελβετός Τραπεζίτης]

Μια νεα αρχη για να ξεφυγει η Brésil απο την μούργα!

[Nandros]

SpoilerShow

[...] How then is Bolsonaro to be classified? Often heard on the left in Brazil, and in the liberal press in Europe, is the opinion that his rise represents a contemporary version of fascism. The same, of course, is a standard depiction of Trump in liberal and left circles in America and the North Atlantic at large, if typically assorted with escape clauses – ‘much like’, ‘reminiscent of’, ‘resembling’ – making clear it is little more than lazy invective.[5] The label is no more plausible in Brazil. Fascism was a reaction to the danger of social revolution in a time of economic dislocation or depression. It commanded dedicated cadres, organised mass movements and possessed an articulated ideology. Brazil had its version in the 1930s, the green-shirt Integralistas, who at their height numbered over a million members, with an articulate leader, Plínio Salgado, an extensive press, publishing programme and set of cultural organisations, and who came close to seizing power in 1938, after the failure of a communist insurrection in 1935. Nothing remotely comparable either in terms of a danger to the established order from the left, or of a disciplined mass force on the right, exists in Brazil today. In 1964, there was still a major communist party, with influence inside the armed forces, a militant trade-union movement, and growing unrest in the countryside, under a weak president calling for radical reforms. That was enough to provoke not fascism but a conventional military dictatorship. In 2018, the communist party of old was long gone, combative trade unions were a back number, the poor passive and dispersed, the PT a mildly reforming party, for years on good terms with big business. Breathing fire, Bolsonaro could win an election. But there is scarcely any organisational infrastructure beneath him and no need for any mass repression since there is no mass opposition to crush. Is Bolsonaro better pigeonholed as a populist? The term now suffers such inflation as the all-purpose bugbear of the bien pensant media that its utility has declined. Undoubtedly, his posture as a valiant foe of the establishment, and style as a rough-hewn man of the people, belong to the repertoire of what is generally viewed as populism. Modelling himself on the president of the US, he outdoes Trump in wrapping himself in the national flag, and spewing a Twitter stream – 70 per cent more tweets than the latter in his first week in office. But in the gallery of right-wing populists today, Bolsonaro does not fit the standard bill in at least two respects. Immigration is not an issue in Brazil, where just 600,000 of a population of 204 million are foreign-born – 0.3 per cent, compared with some 14 per cent in the US and UK, or 15 per cent in Germany. Racism, of course, is an issue, to which Bolsonaro like Trump has made covert appeals, and whose violence in the practices of the police he will encourage. But unlike Trump, he won a large black and pardo constituency in the polls, and is not likely to risk this by anything approaching an equivalent of the xenophobic anti-immigrant rhetoric in the North Atlantic. A third of his party in parliament, indeed, is not white – a higher percentage than in the much vaunted progressive Democratic contingent in the 116th US Congress.

A second significant difference lies in the character of Bolsonaro’s nationalism. Brazil is not a country either afflicted or threatened by loss of sovereignty as in the EU or by imperial decline as in the US or UK, the two drivers of right-wing populism in the North. His patriotic chest-beating is more factitious. Today he is no enemy of foreign capital. His nationalism, in expression hyperbolic enough, essentially takes the form of virulent tropes of anti-socialism, anti-feminism and homophobia, excrescences alien to the Brazilian soul. But it has no quarrel with free markets. In local parlance, it offers the paradox of a populismo entreguista, a ‘supine’ populism – one in principle at least, perfectly willing to hand over national assets to global banks and corporations. Comparison with Trump, Bolsonaro’s closest analogue as a politician, indicates a different set of strengths and weaknesses. Though he comes from a much humbler background, Bolsonaro is less illiterate. Education in a military academy saw to that: books are not a complete mystery to him. Aware of certain of his limitations, he lacks Trump’s degree of egomania. Trump’s overweening confidence in himself comes not just from a millionaire family background, but a long career of success in real estate speculation and showbusiness. Bolsonaro, who has never run anything in his life, has no such existential build-up. He is much less secure. Given, like Trump, to every kind of intemperate outburst, unlike Trump, he will quickly back off if reactions become too negative. The first weeks of his administration have been a cacophony of conflicting statements and retractions or denials of them. It is not just in character, but by circumstance, that Bolsonaro is a more brittle figure. Both he and Trump were catapulted to power virtually overnight, against all expectation. Trump took the presidency with a much lower percentage of the vote – 46 per cent – than Bolsonaro’s 55 per cent majority. But his supporters are ideologically fervent and solidly behind him, whereas Bolsonaro’s support may be wider, but is shallower, as post-electoral polls indicating rejection of many of his proposed policies show. Trump, moreover, came to power by taking over one of the two great parties of the country, where Bolsonaro won power effectively on his own, without any institutional support at the polls. Once elected, on the other hand, he will not, because he cannot, rule without taking account of the institutions around him, as Trump has tried to do. This doesn’t mean he will be less brutal, since in Brazil many of these institutions are more authoritarian than in the US. The indigenous peoples of the Amazon are sure victims: unlike blacks a negligible quantity at the polls, as cattle ranchers sweep across their habitat (with long-term consequences that will not be appeased by the dismal gestures of the Global north towards arresting climate change), they will be the first to suffer. So too, it is easy to imagine especially if the economy fails to pick up and he needs to distract attention from it – Bolsonaro cracking down viciously on student protests; rounding up activists of the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST) or its urban equivalent, the MTST, and banning their organisations; breaking strikes, where necessary. But jungle apart, such repression is likely to be retail, not wholesale. More, for the minute, would be surplus to requirements.

Perry Anderson, Bolsonaro’s Brazil

Άρθρο από το marxmail.org και περιμένεις να το διαβάσει κάποιος;
.

[Mole]

Είναι όντως ακατάλληλο για φιλισταίους.

[Cloud87]

Μια νεα αρχη για να ξεφυγει η Brésil απο την μούργα!

Συγνώμη από περιέργεια ρωτάω αλλά όλα αυτά που βλέπεις γύρω σου δεν σε ανησυχούν καθόλου; Μιλάω για την άνοδο της ακροδεξιάς διεθνώς. Σου φαίνονται αξιόπιστοι αυτοί που αναδεικνύονται τα τελευταία χρόνια; AFD, Lepen και λοιποί. Σου φαίνεται οτι είναι οκ να εμπιστευτείς το μέλλον σου σε κάποιον από αυτούς;

[Nandros]

Μια νεα αρχη για να ξεφυγει η Brésil απο την μούργα!

Συγνώμη από περιέργεια ρωτάω αλλά όλα αυτά που βλέπεις γύρω σου δεν σε ανησυχούν καθόλου; Μιλάω για την άνοδο της ακροδεξιάς διεθνώς. Σου φαίνονται αξιόπιστοι αυτοί που αναδεικνύονται τα τελευταία χρόνια; AFD, Lepen και λοιποί. Σου φαίνεται οτι είναι οκ να εμπιστευτείς το μέλλον σου σε κάποιον από αυτούς;

Δεν θα ασχοληθώ με την Βραζιλία, αφού μετά από 15 χρόνια Λουλισμού, η αλλαγή ήταν αναμενόμενη. Την ακροδεξιότητα του Μπολσονάρο θα την δείξει ο χρόνος.
Στην Ευρώπη - που μας ενδιαφέρει περισσότερο - η ακροδεξιά ανεβαίνει σαν αντίδραση στις μαλακίες της αριστεράς, με τα ανοίξαμε και σας περιμένουμε!
.

[Cloud87]

Μια νεα αρχη για να ξεφυγει η Brésil απο την μούργα!

Συγνώμη από περιέργεια ρωτάω αλλά όλα αυτά που βλέπεις γύρω σου δεν σε ανησυχούν καθόλου; Μιλάω για την άνοδο της ακροδεξιάς διεθνώς. Σου φαίνονται αξιόπιστοι αυτοί που αναδεικνύονται τα τελευταία χρόνια; AFD, Lepen και λοιποί. Σου φαίνεται οτι είναι οκ να εμπιστευτείς το μέλλον σου σε κάποιον από αυτούς;

Δεν θα ασχοληθώ με την Βραζιλία, αφού μετά από 15 χρόνια Λουλισμού, η αλλαγή ήταν αναμενόμενη. Την ακροδεξιότητα του Μπολσονάρο θα την δείξει ο χρόνος.
Στην Ευρώπη - που μας ενδιαφέρει περισσότερο - η ακροδεξιά ανεβαίνει σαν αντίδραση στις μαλακίες της αριστεράς, με τα ανοίξαμε και σας περιμένουμε!
.

Κανένα κίνδυνο να αχνοφαίνεται βλέπεις; (Με τις μαλακίες); Αν επικρατήσει κανένα AFD (λέμε τώρα) βλέπεις κανένα κράτος να γίνεται διενθής σπόνσορας της τρομοκρατίας;

[Cloud87]

Ισως το χειρότερο χαρακτηριστικό των ψυχασθενών είναι πως πιστεύουν οτι έχουν απόλυτο δίκιο.

[Golden Age]

AFD, Lepen και λοιποί.

Δεν ξέρω τί φαντάζεσαι ότι είναι είνα αυτοί που ανέφερες. Αλλά δεν εκφράζουν κάτι άλλο παρα το "πολιτικό mainstream" στην προ των ιδεωδών της Παγκοσμιοποίησης εποχή. Σιγά τα ωά δηλαδή.