Εταιρεία Χάκερς.

[Niki]

Να το θέσω αλλιώς.
Ας πούμε ότι φτιάχνω μια εταιρεία που ασχολείται με την ασφάλεια πληροφορικής.
Ότι χακάρετε στην Ελλάδα να το εντοπίζουν και να τους αποκαλύπτουν.
Αυτό είναι νόμιμο;

[Niki]

Ας διαγραφεί το νήμα δεν έχει νόημα.

[enaon]

Να το θέσω αλλιώς.
Ας πούμε ότι φτιάχνω μια εταιρεία που ασχολείται με την ασφάλεια πληροφορικής.
Ότι χακάρετε στην Ελλάδα να το εντοπίζουν και να τους αποκαλύπτουν.
Αυτό είναι νόμιμο;

δεν υπάρχει χάκινγκ στην Ελλάδα, αν υπήρχε ο κ. Σφακιανάκης θα τους είχε πατάξει αλλά δεν υπάρχει.

[klg]

Τι είδους χακιν θα επιθυμούσες; Κλοπή IP έως τα bit του subnet για παράδειγμα είναι τυπικά ακόμα νόμιμη. Άλλα είδη χάκιν όπως ανοιγοκλείσιμο της πόρτας του CD είναι στην γκρίζα ζώνη από πλευράς νομοθεσίας, ενώ τέλος ενέργειες όπως μετατροπή SVG σε JPEG διώκονται αυστηρά από interpol και CIA.

Θα ήθελα να φτιάξω μια ομάδα με δέκα άτομα που θα έχουν ιεραρχία, δομή με τέσσερεις σέρβερ σε τέσσερεις διαφορετικές χώρες.
Να συνεργάζεται με την δίωξη ηλεκτρονικού εγκλήματος.
Να συνεργάζεται με την ΕΥΠ.
Δουλειά της να είναι να ανακαλύπτει ποιοι χάκαραν δικά μας συστήματα.

Ίσως στόχοι να γίνονται Ερντογάν ,Τουρκικές τράπεζες ξέπλυμα χρήματος , Κατάρ κ.λ.π.
Δωρεάν να αποκαλύπτει τις πληροφορίες.
Εγώ θα σπρώξω τα χρήματα θα το οργανώσω θα δούνε αποτελέσματα και μετά από πέντε χρόνια που θα τελειώσει το κεφάλαιο αν θέλει ας τους προσλάβει το κράτος.
Να κλείσει η εταιρία και εγώ δεν θέλω ούτε ένα ευχαριστώ.
Απλά όλα να γίνουν νόμιμα.
Σαν προσφορά προς την χώρα.

Δεν υπάρχει λόγος να κάνεις τίποτα, τα κάνει όλα αυτά ήδη η ΔΙΚΥΒ.

[relativer777]

Θα ήθελα να επενδύσω και να φτιάξω μια εταιρεία χάκερς με σκοπό να εκπαιδευτούν Ελληνόπουλα και να χακάρουμε συνέχεια τους Τούρκους ,τους Ιρανούς και τους Πακιστανούς.
Αλλά θα ήθελα να είναι νόμιμο όλο αυτό.
Πως μπορεί να γίνει;
Ακόμα θα ήθελα να λειτουργήσει μόνο για πέντε χρόνια δεν θα έχει έσοδα θα έχει μόνο έξοδα και μετά θα την κλείσω.
Γίνετε να είναι νόμιμο κάτι τέτοιο;

Πιστεύω ότι το θέμα σου μπορεί να λυθεί εύκολα σε αυτό το λινκ : https://www.ccc.de/en/
Δέν γνωρίζω πλέον, Εάν ασχολείται με το Hack.
Απουσιάζω πάνω από 20 χρόνια από το κλάμπ.
Είχαμε ειδικά προγράμματα, όπως το back dor Office του Karperski και άλλα αλγοριθμικά για να σπάμε κωδικούς.
Δοκίμασε και μπορεί να βρείς τα κατάλληλα εφόδια και πληροφορίες.
Εταιρεία δεν μπορείς να φτιάξεις για χάκερ, διότι είναι παράνομο το hacking.
Μπορείς κάλλιστα να φτιάξεις ένα κλάμπ Hacker, ή
Να ανοίξεις ένα παράρτημα γνωστού hakers Club.


Για περισσότερες πληροφορίες διάβασε τα κάτωθι:

81
CHAPTER 4
Chaos Computer Club: The Communicative
Construction of Media Technologies
and Infrastructures as a Political Category
Sebastian Kubitschko
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, scholars have theorized about and conducted outstand-
ing research on the interrelation between digital media and political
activism. The interrelation between digital media and emerging forms
of political activism has been investigated in insightful ways especially
when it comes to protest, mobilization and other forms of ‘conten-
tious’ involvement. When it comes to scholarship in the feld of media
and communication the focus of a number of recent studies has been
on movement-based activism and more or less loosely networked col-
lectives (Juris 2012; Theocharis et al. 2015; Mercea et al. 2016). These
studies are particularly valuable because they manage to bridge disci-
plinary boundaries by bringing together analytical and methodologi-
cal approaches from media studies, anthropology, political science and
sociology. Yet, in contrast to the number of writings on networked and
movement-based activism, far less work has been undertaken on more
© The Author(s) 2018
A. Hepp et al. (eds.), Communicative Figurations,
Transforming Communications – Studies in Cross-Media Research,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65584-0_4
S. Kubitschko (*)
ZeMKI, Centre for Media, Communication and Information
Research, University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany
e-mail: sebastian.kubitschko@uni-bremen.de


82 S. Kubitschko
concrete entities such as civil society organizations and on the role media
technologies and infrastructures play in political engagements other than
protest and mobilization (see Karpf 2012). Recent studies on hackers
and hacking—understood as one particular set of contemporary political
engagement—are no exception in this regard, as they tend to focus on
contentious and globally networked forms of activism (Coleman 2014).
By presenting fndings from qualitative research on the Chaos Computer
Club (CCC), one of the world’s oldest and largest hacker organizations, this
chapter displays how hackers’ political engagement today relies on a wide
range of practices related to media technologies and infrastructures and, at
the same time, continues to be oriented towards larger publics as well as ‘tra-
ditional’ centres of political power. While we have certain knowledge about
hacker collectives at large and singular activities of the CCC in particular (see,
for example, Wagenknecht and Korn 2016), we still lack a more detailed
understanding of the processes that ultimately enable the Club to thematize
and problematize the political qualities of specifc media technologies and
infrastructures. By employing the concept of communicative fguration—
actor constellations, communicative practices and their frames of relevance—the
chapter elaborates how the CCC communicatively constructs media technol-
ogies and infrastructures as a political category in its own right.
Adopting a fgurational approach in this context is particularly help-
ful as it allows us to take into account the hacker organization’s devel-
opment over a longer period of time. In addition, it enables researchers
to employ an inclusive understanding of the contemporary ‘media envi-
ronment’ (Hasebrink and Hölig 2014), which includes a wide range of
media technologies and infrastructures, instead of restricting the empiri-
cal inquiry to the use of a singular medium or the effects of specifc
media content. Finally, the approach allows us to investigate the relations
between the communicative fguration that is internal and the commu-
nicative fguration that is external to the organization. To implement
this approach, the chapter will proceed in three aligned steps. First, the
hacker organization itself is conceptualized as a communicative fgura-
tion, which also includes direct political action in the form of hacking.
Second, the chapter explains how the CCC positions itself in the public
discourse around media technologies. Third, the chapter demonstrates
how the Club’s internal fguration and its linkages with relevant actors
such as journalists, politicians and judges as well as the general pub-
lic creates a spiral of legitimation that enables the hacker organization


4 CHAOS COMPUTER CLUB: THE COMMUNICATIVE CONSTRUCTION … 83
to constitute media technologies and infrastructures as publicly recog-
nized political phenomena. What this shows us, ultimately, is how hack-
ers problematize media technologies and infrastructures as a theme and
feld of political engagement in itself, instead of considering them simply
a means to an end.
4.2  Researching Hacker Cultures
Scholars have condensed the far-reaching political relevance of technol-
ogy by emphasizing that not only the appropriation of individual tools
but also access to telecommunications infrastructure such as satellites and
internet servers, as well as ‘logical’ infrastructure such as codes and pro-
tocols, are prime points of political engagement (Milan and Hintz 2013;
Hunsinger and Schrock forthcoming/2017). In other words, with the
increasing relevance of practices related to media technologies and infra-
structures for social arrangements in general, and for political engage-
ments in particular, media technologies and infrastructures increasingly
become sites of political struggle in their own right (Kubitschko 2017).
It is in this context that scholarly interest in ‘hacker cultures’—owing
to the diversity of hacker collectives the plural is essential—has grown
considerably in the past decade. While governmental institutions and
mainstream media often use ‘hacking’ as an umbrella term for com-
puter-related crime, these depictions are contrasted with insightful
research that highlights hackers’ interaction with contemporary political
landscapes.
Chris Kelty (2008) emphasizes that hackers play an important role
in society as they argue with and about technology. Tim Jordan (2013)
characterizes hacktivism as an explicitly political form of computing.
Leah Lievrouw (2011) pictures hacking as ‘alternative computing’ to
describe a range of activities that focus on constructive political, social
and cultural purposes. Gabriella Coleman (2012) depicts hacking not
only as a technical endeavour but also as an aesthetic and a moral project
that converges powerfully with humour, cleverness, craft and politics.
John Postill in his writing on protest movements such as the Indignados
in Spain refers to hackers who combine technological skills with politi-
cal acumen as ‘freedom technologists’ (Postill 2014: 2). There has
been growing interest in hackers’ collaborations with alternative media
networks such as Indymedia (see Giraud 2014). At the same time, the
growing approximation of established news outlets and hackers could be

84 S. Kubitschko
witnessed in WikiLeaks’ collaboration with a range of mainstream media
as well as in Edward Snowden’s disclosures that were initially edited by
Glenn Greenwald for the Guardian. Taken together, recent theoriza-
tion and research highlights the ever more substantial role hackers play
for contemporary social and political arrangements. Overall, it can be
said that recent investigations of hacker cultures bring forward a multi-
layered and revealing characterization of hackers by looking closely at
who they are, what they do and why they do it, instead of preserving ste-
reotypes or proclaiming generalizations. It is this latter conceptual posi-
tioning of hackers, hacking and hacktivism that this research is drawing
on and aims to expand by adapting a fgurational approach.
In the context of recent studies on hacker cultures, the CCC is a
somewhat particular case. First, in contrast to newer hacker collectives,
the Club has been around since the early 1980s—a time before the
World Wide Web when the increasing spread of personal computers fur-
ther stimulated the transition from analogue to digital communication.
Second, the CCC is not necessarily a loosely networked collective but
rather a concrete entity that is registered as a non-proft organization
with around 5,500 members and acts an offcial advocacy group. Third,
for the most part its activities are not destructive or illegal, but best con-
sidered constructive and in accordance with the established law. What
started in 1981 as an informal gathering of a few ‘politically sensitized
computer enthusiasts’ (Wagenknecht and Korn 2016: 1107) today is a
digital rights and civil society organization whose members have advised
all major political parties in Germany over the past years, have written
expert reports for the German constitutional court on six occasions and
have been invited to be part of governmental committees. Organization,
in the context of this framework, is not understood as a static phenom-
enon, but as a ‘discursive construction’ (Fairhurst and Putnam 2004)
produced through an ongoing process of ‘organized sense making’
(Weick et al. 2005). It is understood that there is both an internal side
to this sense-making—members negotiating what the organization is and
should be—and an external side—how the surrounding environment
relates to the organization.
The qualitative case study research (Yin 2014) presented in this chap-
ter relies on an ‘extended case method’ (Burawoy 1998) that is based
on a mixed method approach. It brings together 40 face-to-face open-
ended interviews with Club members (e.g. co-founders, spokesper-
sons, new members), participant observations during public gatherings

4 CHAOS COMPUTER CLUB: THE COMMUNICATIVE CONSTRUCTION … 85
at hackerspaces across Germany (e.g. Berlin, Hamburg, Stuttgart) and
hacker conventions (e.g. Chaos Communication Congress in Berlin,
SIGINT in Cologne) as well as during more private get-togethers (e.g.
personal meetings with journalists). Based on a constructivist grounded
theory approach (Charmaz 2002: 677), the primary data set was sup-
plemented with a contextualizing media analysis: taking into account
‘old’ and ‘new’ self-mediation practices (e.g. the Club’s Datenschleuder
magazine, press releases, the offcial CCC Twitter account @chaosup-
dates, legal expert reports, Chaosradio), prominent media coverage (e.g.
mainstream media after hacks, during annual Congress) as well as differ-
ent forms and styles of media access (e.g. columns of CCC members in
mainstream outlets, participation in political talk shows, interviews with
CCC members). The lion’s share of the research took place over a three-
year period from 2011 to 2014 and the contextualizing media analysis
continued until 2016.
4.3 Forming a Coherent Hacker Organization
Let me start by going way back in time to unpack the political devel-
opment of the CCC. The Club’s frst activity that attracted atten-
tion to the hackers as actors in the feld of computing was the so-called
Btx hack. Since its nationwide launch in 1983, Btx (abbreviation for
Bildschirmtext, ‘screen text’) was an ‘interactive’ online system that was
part of the German Federal Post Offce’s monopoly on mediated com-
munication—including mail, telephone, computer networks and hard-
ware. Integrating a telephone and a screen in one medium, the main
purpose of Btx was to facilitate and promote e-commerce and digi-
tal communication. Although the system was far less networked, it can
be seen as a precursor of more recent services such as online payment
systems and news tickers. In the autumn of 1984, two CCC members
exploited a security faw in Btx, which allowed the hackers to trans-
fer 135,000 Deutschmark (c. 68,000 euros) from Hamburg’s savings
bank to their own donation page. Immediately after the hack, the CCC
retransferred the money and reported the incident to the data protec-
tion commissioner. The hack not only demonstrated the system’s security
faws but also provided evidence of the hackers’ technology-related skills
and knowledge.l
At this time, the network of actors interrelated and communicat-
ing with each other was still readily comprehensible and the Club’s

86 S. Kubitschko
communicative practices were largely based on face-to-face interaction, as
most of its members were based in Hamburg. Yet the increasing spread
of personal computers and digital infrastructures such as bulletin board
systems at that time went hand in hand with the emergence of local CCC
chapters and meet-ups across Germany. In stark contrast to other exist-
ing means of communication, the newly developed networks were largely
decentralized. This was important in a social and a political sense when
it comes to actor constellations. As hackers were still a minor sub-cultural
phenomenon and people interested in the creative and subversive use of
technology were dispersed across the country, the possibility of sharing
information and knowledge across time and space was a big step towards
building a sense of communality. More concretely, the emerging abil-
ity to merge offine and online communication showed the initial Club
members that new forms of connectivity were possible, opening up new
modes of engagement. The frames of relevance that guided the Club’s
constituting practices were predominantly concerned with the political
demand for more open and freely accessible communication and infor-
mation infrastructures. Overall, the character of the CCC was defned by
the objective to form a collective of politically motivated technologists
that would not only do things with technology but also act upon it. The
Btx hack was exemplary in this context as it explicitly problematized the
Post Offce’s monopoly by showing its limitations and shortcomings.
Similarly, the desire to communicate and collaborate and to coordinate
activities within and beyond the Club’s boundaries through decentral-
ized infrastructures was the driving force behind the hackers’ efforts to
establish these networks.
Yet, throughout the mid- and late 1980s, the CCC had to acknowl-
edge that to establish and keep up its frames of relevance was anything
but an easy task. During that time, the CCC was publicly affliated with
illegal hacks that, amongst other things, involved the Soviet Union’s
KGB (the Committee for State Security) and hacking into NASA
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration) computer systems. As
internal communication soured, accusations got out of hand and dis-
putes amongst core members led to controversies that almost saw the
Club’s dissolution. After reorganizing and re-establishing its own iden-
tity over the coming years, the hacker organization got its feet back on
the ground by keeping its activities more coherent and better struc-
tured. The CCC also reformed its organizational structure. While the
Club continued to grow and spread across German-speaking countries


4 CHAOS COMPUTER CLUB: THE COMMUNICATIVE CONSTRUCTION … 87
and increasingly brought together people who contributed heteroge-
neous backgrounds, perspectives and experiences, the 1990s saw the
re-emergence of a more exclusive core team; which echoed the organi-
zation’s constitution in its early days. This team of core members
effectively coordinated the heterogeneity by merging face-to-face and
mediated communication that relied on technologies such as Internet
Relay Chats (IRC) and other self-programmed protocols for online mes-
saging and data transfer, allowing one-to-one as well as group communi-
cation. Communicative practices were not only critical in the exchange of
expertise and the debate of issues across the CCC’s members, but also in
the formation of a core team of actors who would coordinate the hack-
ers’ collective actions and specify its frames of relevance.
In this context, drawing clear boundaries between inward-oriented
and outward-oriented communication was essential. One of the main
reasons for establishing and upholding internal communication bound-
aries was the importance of coordinating collective action in ways that
didn’t allow ‘outsiders’ such as journalists and other actors interested
in the Club’s undertakings to gain sensitive information about ongo-
ing or upcoming activities. For this purpose, communication had to
be more exclusive and oriented towards individual members and sub-
groups instead of the Club as a whole. Participants identifed several
tools as adequate solutions to establish tailored and more effcient modes
of communication, with IRC being one of the main channels for elab-
orating projects amongst a rather exclusive circle of members. In con-
trast to the more open information environment of internal mailing lists
to which large numbers of members could subscribe, IRC was a much
more restricted channel: it allowed longer-term, active and trusted mem-
bers to communicate amongst each other and to form small groups that
shared valuable information. Being able to communicate with each other
through online systems such as IRC allowed the CCC to create different
layers of exclusivity in which members could communicate one to one
and amongst a selected few. These layers permitted the hackers to solve
most of the issues related to keeping up boundaries between internal and
external communication. Likewise, these layers formed and deepened
existing organizational structures within the Club by creating exclusive
communication environments for the sake of executing political work in
more dynamic and secretive ways.
More recently, the spectrum of these tools has, of course, increased
beyond IRC. While newer channels were not ‘cannibalizing’ existing

88 S. Kubitschko
tools, CCC members were employing contemporary digital technologies
that played an important role in internal collaboration, coordination of
digital direct action and more basic practices such as fne-tuning press
releases. Web-based editing tools, for example, allowed a number of indi-
viduals to collaboratively edit a fle, either simultaneously in real time, or
deferred in non-real time. The major asset of these web-based editors,
generally referred to as Pads, was seen to be in their ability to enable
time-effcient, location-independent collaborations amongst a chosen
group of people. Pads were an advancement on wikis, for example, as
they brought different technological affordances together and ena-
bled CCC members to act interlinked, multi-locally, and time-effcient.
Depending on the particular need of the group, different communica-
tive practices that formed layers of exclusivity fuently merged from one
application to another. While the use of particular tools such as IRC and
Pads was creating and underlining organizational structures, this was
not only done for reasons of secrecy or exclusivity. The fact that only
a selected number of individuals were involved in particular activities
and included in exclusive communicative practices was to a large degree
also down to practicality. Considering the growing size of the CCC, the
Club’s activities and internal organization would be simply unmanage-
able without the discussed practices. Bringing together a well-integrated
group of people and keeping the number of participants in a given col-
lective action down meant that the communication process could be
more direct, productive and effective.
The overall level of connectivity had intensifed drastically since
the emergence of the Club in the early 1980s—from bulletin boards,
through global communication networks, to instantaneous and overlap-
ping web-based interaction. Yet in spite of this ongoing development,
one can observe certain forms of continuity. Despite the rapid growth
in membership fgures, the CCC’s communicative practices enabled
members to form internal groups and layers of communicative intimacy
that created margins between internal and external communication and
maintained organizational boundaries within the Club. Communicative
practices related to face-to-face communication as well as tools that
emerged in the 1990s, and more contemporary technologies allowed a
core group of members to stabilize the Club’s political engagement suc-
cessfully over time. On the one hand, restricting the number of actors
also helped to maintain the boundary between internal and external
communication. On the other hand, it enabled the Club to establish a

4 CHAOS COMPUTER CLUB: THE COMMUNICATIVE CONSTRUCTION … 89
more constructive communication process, as a lower number of partici-
pating members also meant a lower number of differing opinions; which,
in turn, enabled the group to keep the frames of relevance more focused
and to make decisions in a timely manner. Accordingly, performing
direct digital action in the form of hacking was directly related to com-
municative practices, as they later played an important role in relation
to organizing, coordinating and executing the Club’s political projects.
Despite rapid growth of the organization, communicative practices allow
the Club to act on politically controversial issues in timely and discreet
ways. Consequently, considering the internal side of sense-making when
it comes to the CCC’s organizational formation, one can see how com-
municative practices, a specifc actor constellation and establishing frames
of relevance go hand in hand. This communicative fguration within
the hacker organization formed the Club’s basis for executing well-
orchestrated hacks, emphasizing that for the hacker organization media
technologies and infrastructures are not simply instruments for acting
politically but are political matters in themselves.
Only taking into account the past decade, the following hacks are of
particular relevance in this context. In October 2006 the CCC, together
with the Dutch citizen group Wij Vertrouwen Stemcomputers Niet
(‘We do not trust voting computers’), hacked a voting computer that
was at that time in use in elections in the Netherlands, France, Germany
and the United States. By demonstrating that the computers were not
forgery-proof and that a fraud would be almost impossible to recon-

Και στο Επόμενο

[klg]

relativer, το ακραίο μπλακχατι του παραπχώρουμ, επικές στιγμές πάλι εδώ μέσα

[perseus]

12 εκ. θα κοστίσει. Θα σου στείλω ένα λογαριασμό τραπέζης, μόλις καταθέσεις εκεί τα πρώτα 100Κ, θα επικοινωνήσει μαζί σου ο αρχηγός, για τις λεπτομέρειες.

Εχω μια επιταγη 13 εκατ , στείλε ένα εκατ .δτον λογαριασμό μου και είμαστε ενταξει

[Τζιτζιμιτζιχότζιρας]

Θα ήθελα να επενδύσω και να φτιάξω μια εταιρεία χάκερς με σκοπό να εκπαιδευτούν Ελληνόπουλα και να χακάρουμε συνέχεια τους Τούρκους ,τους Ιρανούς και τους Πακιστανούς.
Αλλά θα ήθελα να είναι νόμιμο όλο αυτό.
Πως μπορεί να γίνει;
Ακόμα θα ήθελα να λειτουργήσει μόνο για πέντε χρόνια δεν θα έχει έσοδα θα έχει μόνο έξοδα και μετά θα την κλείσω.
Γίνετε να είναι νόμιμο κάτι τέτοιο;

Θέλω να ηρεμήσεις κάποια στιγμή.

[Τζιτζιμιτζιχότζιρας]

Θα ήθελα να επενδύσω και να φτιάξω μια εταιρεία χάκερς με σκοπό να εκπαιδευτούν Ελληνόπουλα και να χακάρουμε συνέχεια τους Τούρκους ,τους Ιρανούς και τους Πακιστανούς.
Αλλά θα ήθελα να είναι νόμιμο όλο αυτό.
Πως μπορεί να γίνει;
Ακόμα θα ήθελα να λειτουργήσει μόνο για πέντε χρόνια δεν θα έχει έσοδα θα έχει μόνο έξοδα και μετά θα την κλείσω.
Γίνετε να είναι νόμιμο κάτι τέτοιο;

Nα ζητήσεις επιδότηση.

Από Κρήτη δεν είσαι;

[enterprise-psi]

Ας διαγραφεί το νήμα δεν έχει νόημα.

[dna replication]

Θα ήθελα

εχεις π.μ.

[Ερμής]

Θα ήθελα να επενδύσω και να φτιάξω μια εταιρεία χάκερς με σκοπό να εκπαιδευτούν Ελληνόπουλα και να χακάρουμε συνέχεια τους Τούρκους ,τους Ιρανούς και τους Πακιστανούς.
Αλλά θα ήθελα να είναι νόμιμο όλο αυτό.
Πως μπορεί να γίνει;
Ακόμα θα ήθελα να λειτουργήσει μόνο για πέντε χρόνια δεν θα έχει έσοδα θα έχει μόνο έξοδα και μετά θα την κλείσω.
Γίνετε να είναι νόμιμο κάτι τέτοιο;

πολύ καλό!

[relativer777]

2

struct, the hackers convincingly showed that basing elections on the use
of these computers would endanger the democratic process. In 2008
Club members obtained fngerprints from the German interior min-
ister at that time, Wolfgang Schäuble, and published them in a format
designed to fool passport fngerprint readers. The hack underlined the
vulnerability of biometric identity systems at a time when biometric pass-
ports were increasingly being introduced on a global scale and fnger-
prints became obligatory in German passports. The critique of the spread
of insecure biometric applications in day-to-day life was recapitulated
when in 2013 the Club hacked Apple’s Touch ID—a technology that
allows users to unlock their iPhone by fngerprint identifcation—within
a week of its release. Another prominent recent collective action was the
so-called Staatstrojaner (‘Federal Trojan Horse’) hack. In 2011, two
years before the issue of surveillance gained global currency owing to
Edward Snowden’s revelations, the CCC disclosed surveillance software

90 S. Kubitschko
used by German police forces that violated the terms set by the constitu-
tional court on this matter. Yet, as will be shown in the following section,
to understand the way the Club thematizes and problematizes the politi-
cal qualities of technology, one also needs to take into account another
dimension: besides the aforementioned internal dynamics the Club’s
activities were, of course, also interrelated to external elements.
4.4 From the Inside to the Outside
Taking the above into account, it might come as no surprise that from
day one the Club complemented its hacks with outward-oriented com-
munication aimed to make the hackers’ fndings comprehensible and
its political demands visible to the largest possible public. The Btx hack
itself, for example, would not have been overly effectual if news media
had not picked up the story. As news media reported widely on the hack
and were largely in support of the hackers’ criticism, the hack gained an
event character. Following the Btx hack, the CCC was recognized as a
collective actor that had something relevant to say about the communi-
cation and information landscape in Germany. The CCC was invited to
speak on the main television news magazine of public broadcaster ZDF,
the advice of Club members was frequently sought by national newspa-
pers, they were asked by corporations to speak on data security and were
requested by the newly established Green Party to write a report on the
Party’s potential use of networked computing. One of the important
details here is that instead of only being the subject of media coverage,
the CCC had the opportunity to communicate its point of view to differ-
ent audiences.
Related to the relationship of non-state actors and established media
outlets, Richard Ericson and his colleagues (1989) make a useful distinc-
tion between media access and media coverage. By access, they mean the
news space, time and context to reasonably represent one’s own perspec-
tive, whereas coverage entails news space and time but not necessarily
the context for favourable representations (Ericson et al. 1989: 5). This
distinction is vital because it demonstrates that media access—as with
access to all kinds of resources at institutional levels—remains a politi-
cal question (Freedman 2014). While media coverage simply denotes
the amount and prominence of attention and visibility a group receives,
media access indicates that an actor has a particular standing and is
treated as an actor with a serious voice in the media. Gaining positive



4 CHAOS COMPUTER CLUB: THE COMMUNICATIVE CONSTRUCTION … 91
coverage once may not be hard. Sustaining regular access and stand-
ing, which enhances the actor’s ability to embed its concepts and ideals
in public discourse (see Phillips et al. 2004), can be extremely diffcult.
Seen from this perspective, the Btx hack shows the ways in which the
CCC as a non-state actor had to rely on established media outlets to
mobilize public support, to increase the validity of their demands and
to circulate their messages beyond like-minded people. Established news
media were, however, not the only part of the Club’s media ensemble;
and these are a few examples that date back to the CCC’s early days.
Right from the start the Club had close affliations with the then newly
founded alternative tageszeitung (‘daily newspaper’), commonly referred
to as taz, one of the Club’s co-founders (Wau Holland) being a column-
ist during the mid-1980s. In addition, the hacker organization has pub-
lished its own Datenschleuder magazine since 1984 (still ongoing) and
was very active in enlarging bulletin boards systems (BBS) in Germany
throughout the 1980s. Consequently, the Club’s media ensemble relied
on practices related to analogue and digital media and comprised both
coverage by and access to news outlets.
At this point it is helpful to make a leap in time and focus on more
recent developments. The end of the 1990s and the early 2000s saw a
growing pervasiveness of radical and alternative media platforms and
online networks that amplifed actors’ ability to voice the political rel-
evance of their endeavours (see Rodríguez et al. 2014). Along with this
development, scholars emphasize that actors increasingly invest human,
technological and fnancial resources in ‘“being the media” instead of
hating it’ (Cammaerts 2012: 125). The CCC is no exception in this
regard. Over the past two decades, Club members have initiated a reg-
ular radio show (Chaosradio), podcasts (e.g. CRE and Alternativlos),
accounts on both popular and alternative online platforms such as
Twitter, Quitter and personal blogs, to name some of the more promi-
nent examples. Instead of abandoning outward oriented channels such
as the Chaosradio show or the Datenschleuder magazine, the Club inte-
grates its ‘trans-media’ (Costanza-Chock 2014) efforts into a ‘media
manifold’ (Couldry 2012), where one communicative practice does not
necessarily substitute for the other, but plays a part in the Club’s overall
media ensemble.
Following this depiction, one might expect that the CCC has detached
itself from interactions with mainstream outlets. This is not the case
at all. On the contrary, the CCC has in fact intensifed its interactions



92 S. Kubitschko
with well-established media. In particular its styles and modes of access
to mainstream media have diversifed and multiplied (e.g. personal con-
tacts to journalists, writing regular columns for well-established newspa-
pers, being an editorial member of online outlets, acting as informants).
Despite the ability to increase its media ensemble, the importance of gain-
ing positive coverage by and access to established media outlets and news
channels is essential for the CCC. Mainstream outlets are important sites
for the Club to exist in the public mind, make its voices heard and achieve
public recognition beyond the circle of like-minded individuals—especially
important because of the ongoing fragmentation of the media environ-
ment and the competition of different actors for public attention. Being
covered by and having access to mainstream media outlets continues to be
an effective and possibly necessary route to co-determine public discourse
for non-state actors such as the CCC.
For emerging groups such as Anonymous, it has been argued that sat-
ing the media hunger for spectacle, media attention and column inches
has become an end in itself and therefore an obstacle to political move-
ment building (Coleman 2014). In the context of the CCC, it cannot
be said that the hacker organization has been captivated by the demands
of news media and popular online platforms, which might lead to trivi-
alization and debasement of its aims. Similarly, the Club is not aiming
for visibility at any price; which can be seen in the fact that it does not
make use of Facebook or many other capital oriented and data hungry
infrastructures. In the case of the CCC, publications of particular activi-
ties such as the Staatstrojaner hack in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
are the result of elaborated coordination amongst core members of the
Club and the newspapers’ editors. While mediated visibility does not
equal empowerment and is not a political end in itself, access to estab-
lished news channels appears to be particularly important for ‘hackers’
also because the term still tends to have a negative connotation.
Based on a multi-layered media ensemble that reaches different audi-
ences and publics, the CCC is able to communicate its political mes-
sage to a wide range of actors. As a consequence of this, the hackers’
outward-oriented communication establishes and strengthens the Club’s
position in public discourse. It is important to mention here that the
hackers’ communicative practices are not limited to mediated communi-
cation but, as briefy mentioned above, also strongly rely on face-to-face
interactions; which is the case when members are invited to share their
expertise in governmental committees and public hearings, and when

4 CHAOS COMPUTER CLUB: THE COMMUNICATIVE CONSTRUCTION … 93
they advise individual legislators and politicians, as well as when they
are invited as experts to advise sections of a parliamentary party in the
Bundestag or the constitutional court in Germany. The ability to interact
with ‘outsiders’ largely relies on the fact that a core group of members
forms clear and well-recognizable frames of relevance through organiz-
ing both inward- and outward-oriented communication. Bringing the
previous section together with this line of reasoning, one can remark that
the CCC’s internal communicative fguration not only enables the Club
to execute direct digital action in the form of hacking, but also allows the
hacker organization to communicate with a diversity of relevant actors
(including the larger public) in coherent ways. In the case of the CCC,
the relations between hacking and the communicative fguration within
the Club are best understood as interlocking arrangements (Kubitschko
2015). These, as will be argued below, have wider consequences for the
Chaos Computer Club’s standing as a political actor. To substantiate this
line of argument, the fnal section will put the spotlight on the dynamics
that result from the fgurational arrangements discussed above, and show
how they put the Club into a position to infuence larger frames of rel-
evance related to media technologies and infrastructures.
4.5  Spiral of Legitimation
So far this chapter has argued that the hacker organization’s internal
fguration is closely connected to its way of executing political work.
In addition it has been shown that the CCC’s direct digital action and
its mode of publicizing its activities rely on one another. Interestingly
enough, when we look more closely at the way the Club interacts with
the media environment and with institutionalized politics, one notices
that theses interactions complement one another or are in fact even
interdependent. The Club’s media ensemble and interactions with rel-
evant actors perpetuate each other and co-determine the Club’s abil-
ity to politicize media technologies and infrastructures. The dynamic
at hand that best describes this process will be referred to as a spiral of
legitimation.
According to Mark Suchman, legitimacy is practically the basis of poli-
tics as it addresses the forces ‘that constrain, construct, and empower
organizational actors’ (Suchman 1995: 571). In the expanding literature
on legitimacy Suchman’s defnition has been generally accepted as the
most suitable: ‘Legitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that

94 S. Kubitschko
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and defnitions’
(Suchman 1995: 574). Overall, legitimacy, to a large degree, rests on
being socially ‘comprehensible’ and ‘taken-for-granted’ (Suchman 1995).
Echoing the notion of taken-for-grantedness, Berger and Luckmann
(1967: 94–95) consider legitimation a process whereby comprehen-
sibility deepens and crystallizes. Skill, effort and practice are regarded
necessary elements in the process by which an actor becomes taken-for-
granted (Bourdieu 2000). Accordingly, legitimacy is not simply out there
for the asking, but has to be created as well as exploited by actors who
seek to gain legitimation.
Scholars who diagnose correlations between communicative prac-
tices and the social standing of political actors have argued for a strong
link between media representation and legitimacy (Lazarsfeld and
Merton 2004 [1948]; Koopmans 2004). This chapter agrees with these
accounts, as far as the media environment serves both as an indicator of
legitimacy by society at large and as a source of legitimacy in its own
right (Deephouse and Suchman 2008). At the same time, the fgura-
tional approach presented here complements and complicates existing
lines of reasoning. It does so in two ways. First, as has been underlined
above, one needs to take into account both actors’ inward oriented and
outward oriented communicative practices. In addition, it is understood
that media representation today goes far beyond coverage by mainstream
media as it relies on actors’ multi-layered media ensemble. Second,
instead of arguing for a straightforward causal correlation between
‘media attention’ and social standing, this research reveals a more eclectic
process: a spiral of legitimation that is based on the relation between the
organization’s internal communicative fguration and the communicative
fguration related to the public discourse around the political qualities of
contemporary media technologies and infrastructures.
At least over the past two decades it has become a dominant frame of
relevance in public discourse that along with their pervasiveness (or even
omnipresence) media technologies and infrastructures are an ever more
important part of the social world. More and more people make use of
and relate their daily activities to media in one way or another. At the
same time legislators, politicians, judges and other actors with decisive
power related to policy-making and the law are in need of advice, con-
sulting and grounded recommendations. That is to say, the CCC’s abil-
ity to manoeuvre their issues into public discourse and to advance their

4 CHAOS COMPUTER CLUB: THE COMMUNICATIVE CONSTRUCTION … 95
political goals to a great extent relates to prevailing social arrangements.
The more media technologies and infrastructures fnd their way into peo-
ple’s everyday lives, the more attentive citizens, media representatives and
decision-makers are to actors who demonstrate and articulate reasonable
engagement in relation to technical transformations. Gaining and main-
taining legitimacy is something that is framed and conditioned by social
realities. While legitimation can be at least partially secured through insti-
tutions such as the media, legitimacy is never simply mediated.
In the case of the CCC, institutional politics react, amongst other
things, to public pressure that is built up through a multi-layered media
ensemble; which confrms that actors who receive preferred standing
and are able to stabilize their appearances across the media environment
over time tend to be considered trustworthy. Interestingly enough, this
relationship also operates the other way round. Media representatives
consider CCC members as legitimate voices and provide them access to
their outlets owing to their regular interaction with institutional poli-
tics. Politicians, legislators and judges learn about the organization’s
engagement in part through the hackers’ outward oriented communi-
cation. As a consequence, they invite Club members to articulate their
stance in particular contexts, such as committees, consultations and hear-
ings. Owing to the Club’s involvement in institutional politics, differ-
ent media outlets regard the CCC as worth covering as well as worth
granting access to. Media environments and institutional politics, each
in their own way, mutually signify the CCC’s engagement before a wide
public. As a consequence its virtuous role as a civil society organization
that has something valuable to say about the political relevance of tech-
nical developments continues to be acknowledged, inscribed and stabi-
lized. Throughout this process, the Club gains opportunities to illustrate
its activities, articulate its objectives and politicize particular themes. This
process is accompanied by the Club’s regular direct digital actions that
constantly demonstrate the hackers’ high level of technology-related
skills, experience and knowledge. Overall, instead of linearity one needs
to stress rotation and reciprocity as the defning processual dynamics that
create an attribution process, whereby the narration ‘CCC hackers are
the good ones’ emerges and stabilizes.
This is not to say that this spiral of legitimation cannot go into
reverse. Legitimacy is never defnitively acquired and remains open to
challenge and dependent on social perceptions (Rosanvallon 2011: 7).
Similarly, it is understood that no political actor is (il)legitimate for 100%

96 S. Kubitschko
of the time or across all locations. The Club’s de-legitimation during the
mid-1980s is a telling example in this context. Accordingly, a spiral of
legitimation refers to the growth and spread as well as decline and with-
drawal of a given actor’s legitimacy and explicitly takes into considera-
tion that organizational legitimacy changes over time. Conceptualizing
the processes at hand as a spiral of legitimation takes into account that
legitimation is never constructed in a vacuum, but relies on communica-
tive practices and is evolved in relation to concrete actors’ constellations
within an environment that has specifc dominant frames of relevance.
While it is impossible to (mathematically) measure legitimation, it is
certainly possible to observe a given actor’s standing, reputation and
taken-for-grantedness. Similarly, by taking into account the fgurational
arrangements both within and surrounding a given organization it is
possible to determine whether the spiral is in an upward or downward
dynamic.
Considering that, analytically, one can distinguish between differ-
ent levels of legitimation, it should be noted that empirically these levels
overlap the term spiral of legitimation, which conceptualizes legitimacy
as a relational process. Legitimacy is not a matter of singular events but
of the relation between different communicative fgurations over time.
Again, it is necessary to highlight that spirals of legitimation are not self-
perpetuating feedback loops. Neither do they rest on fgurations that
occur overnight. Accordingly, spirals of legitimation point to a process
of inscription over time whereby individuals coming together around
common ends, objectives or projects develop into meaningful politi-
cal actors. By doing so, it echoes understandings that see time as a criti-
cal component in actors being able to co-determine political settings, as
political claims can only be realized over the long term (see Andrews and
Edwards 2004). Looking more closely at the Club’s legitimation, one
notices that the hackers’ current ability to practise a demanding vision
of politics is strongly affliated with the organization’s history. For more
than 30 years, CCC members have been acting on the politicization of
media technologies and infrastructures. Only by transporting its activities
and voice over time and space did the Club manage to establish itself as a
reliable reference point with a lasting resonance to which different actors,
publics and audiences can relate.
Sustaining political engagement over time to challenge existing
conceptions of what is understood as political and shifting the legiti-
mate boundaries of recognized actors is a demanding task. The CCC

4 CHAOS COMPUTER CLUB: THE COMMUNICATIVE CONSTRUCTION … 97
continuously actualizes its engagement to avoid it becoming vague
through more or less spectacular hacks, and has established mechanisms
to survive the ebbs and fows of mass attention. Considering the social
standing of the Club as a trusted civil society organization, one needs to
take into account distinct temporalities that include the effective publi-
cizing of actions such as the Staatstrojaner hack as well as the hackers’
continuous contributions to the public discourse around the political
qualities of media technologies and infrastructures since the early 1980s.
4.6  Conclusion
Taking into account both the deep embeddedness of hacker cultures
in the evolution of computerized society and the concrete case of the
Chaos Computer Club, it becomes clear that acting on media technolo-
gies and infrastructures entails a wide set of activities: it manifests itself
not only in form of direct engagement with technical devices and sys-
tems, but also occurs through interaction with different actors, through
articulating viewpoints, through sharing knowledge and experiences in
different circumstances. As has been argued in this chapter, to under-
stand the way the Club has gained recognition as a trustful actor that
has something valuable to say about the role media technologies and
infrastructures play in society, it is benefcial to investigate the commu-
nicative fgurations within and surrounding the hacker organization. By
investigating the constellation of actors, the frames of relevance and com-
municative practices, the chapter shows how the CCC thematizes media
technologies and infrastructures as sites of an active political struggle
in their own right. Doing so not only allows conceptualizing the rela-
tions between hacking and the communicative fguration within the Club
as interlocking arrangements but also points towards a dynamic that
has been described as a spiral of legitimation. This denotes the process
through which the CCC’s engagement is acknowledged and stabilized
(or denied and destabilized) over time. While the Club’s current role as
a trusted civil society organization strongly relates to internal fgurations,
it is likewise related to the public discourse surrounding media technolo-
gies and infrastructures’ role as an ever more important part of the social
world. By bringing these two dimensions together and by considering
time as a critical component, it is possible to further understandings of
organizational actors’ ability to co-determine political arrangements.

98 S. Kubitschko
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holder.

Εάν θελήσεις επί πλέον πληροφορίες, απλά ρώτα με !

[relativer777]

relativer, το ακραίο μπλακχατι του παραπχώρουμ, επικές στιγμές πάλι εδώ μέσα

Φίλε klg τί να γίνει ;
Τα παλιά κουσούρια δεν κόβονται !

[relativer777]

Τι είδους χακιν θα επιθυμούσες; Κλοπή IP έως τα bit του subnet για παράδειγμα είναι τυπικά ακόμα νόμιμη. Άλλα είδη χάκιν όπως ανοιγοκλείσιμο της πόρτας του CD είναι στην γκρίζα ζώνη από πλευράς νομοθεσίας, ενώ τέλος ενέργειες όπως μετατροπή SVG σε JPEG διώκονται αυστηρά από interpol και CIA.

Θα ήθελα να φτιάξω μια ομάδα με δέκα άτομα που θα έχουν ιεραρχία, δομή με τέσσερεις σέρβερ σε τέσσερεις διαφορετικές χώρες.
Να συνεργάζεται με την δίωξη ηλεκτρονικού εγκλήματος.
Να συνεργάζεται με την ΕΥΠ.
Δουλειά της να είναι να ανακαλύπτει ποιοι χάκαραν δικά μας συστήματα.

Ίσως στόχοι να γίνονται Ερντογάν ,Τουρκικές τράπεζες ξέπλυμα χρήματος , Κατάρ κ.λ.π.
Δωρεάν να αποκαλύπτει τις πληροφορίες.
Εγώ θα σπρώξω τα χρήματα θα το οργανώσω θα δούνε αποτελέσματα και μετά από πέντε χρόνια που θα τελειώσει το κεφάλαιο αν θέλει ας τους προσλάβει το κράτος.
Να κλείσει η εταιρία και εγώ δεν θέλω ούτε ένα ευχαριστώ.
Απλά όλα να γίνουν νόμιμα.
Σαν προσφορά προς την χώρα.

Δεν υπάρχει λόγος να κάνεις τίποτα, τα κάνει όλα αυτά ήδη η ΔΙΚΥΒ.

Ούτος ή άλλος δεν θα κάνει τίποτα.
Οι καιροί έχουν αλλάξει ριζικά και αμετάκλητα.
Το Hacking είναι πλέον αναχρονιστικό και χωρίς ενδιαφέρον. Θα το καταλάβει σύντομα ότι υπάρχουν κρατικές υπηρεσίες που έχουν αυτή την αρμοδιότητα και μόνο η κρατικές ειδικές υπηρεσίες είναι νόμιμες.
Απλοί πολίτες εάν το επιχειρήσουν είναι παράνομοι
Και διώκονται ποινικά ως κατάσκοποι !!!